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ABSTRACT
In this paper, a method is presented for controlling
autonomous agent behavior by filtering the agent's input.
Without such filtering, the agent is allowed to have exact
knowledge of the state of its domain, resulting in a pattern
of performance that is unrealistic and consistently
successful. However, filtering that knowledge into beliefs
is a way of making it possible for the agent to be
unsuccessful some of the time. That is, if the agent is
working from beliefs, and the beliefs happen to be wrong,
then the agent may not reach its goal at that particular
instant. An application for this method--control of an
autonomous combat force in a simulation system--is developed
and demonstrated in this paper. The algorithm for
generating beliefs about battlefield events models the
information-gathering system of a combat force. However,
this model attempts to simulate the results of the
information-gathering system, and not the cognitive or
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A. THE AUTONOMOUS AGENT PROBLEM
The word "autonomy" refers to a condition of being
independent or self-governing[Ref. 1]. In a
computer simulation system, an autonomous agent is an object
or some other entity that appears to possess sufficient
"intelligence" to govern its own behavior. It can execute
and monitor its decisions during the course of a simulation.
The agent's intelligence comes from a computer program that
contains information about some domain or universe of
discourse, and a set of rules for using that information.
This thesis is about an autonomous force (AF)
application that controls a group of combat vehicles in a
simulation system. The vehicles represent a small force of
tanks employing battlefield information and background
knowledge to make tactical decisions directed toward the
accomplishment of an assigned mission.
The remainder of this chapter covers the overall
development environment and presents key issues related to
the development of autonomous agent applications.
B. NPSNET
The autonomous force program discussed in this paper
was developed for the Naval Postgraduate School Networked
1
Simulator (NPSNET), developed at the Computer Science
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School[Ref. 2].
The system is a combat simulation environment in which users
can interact with each other, as well as with the system.
Users of NPSNET may operate any one of several hundred
aircraft or ground vehicles. Many of the vehicles are
armed, so that users of the simulator can engage each other
in mock battles. The battlefield is a 3D representation of
a real environment, such as Fort Hunter Liggett, California.
It contains mountains, hills, valleys, roads, trees, open
spaces and other features. The terrain color can be green
to represent vegetation, or brown for generic dirt. The
choice of atmospheric conditions ranges from clear to foggy.
The role of the AF program in this simulation is to
provide users of NPSNET with an automated opponent. If the
simulator were employed as a combat training tool, the
availability of an AF program provides many training
opportunities, such as being able to fight mock battles on
the simulator without the assistance of another user, or
forming teams to oppose AF vehicles as a small unit instead
of individually.
The employment of autonomous forces has many precedents
in the past development of simulation systems. One of the
most successful examples is the Semi-automated Forces
(SAFOR) used by the U.S. Army's Simulation Network
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(SIMNET) [Ref. 3]. An important characteristic of
the SAFOR approach is the "man-in-the-loop" concept. That
is, the automated forces are ultimately controlled by a
human decision maker, thus the name 'semi-automated.' In
the conduct of a simulation, this setup allows commanders
and staffs to control large forces without necessarily using
manned simulators. This feature also populates the
battlefield with more objects, thus creating a more
realistic combat environment.
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND ISSUES
From the beginning, certain assumptions influenced the
design and implementation of this AF program. In this
section, the key assumption that impacts on the entire
organization of the program is discussed.
Each active station in NPSNET can display the current
state of the simulation. For example, if a user makes a
right turn in a vehicle, the other users will see that
vehicle turning right on their screens. Each station relies
on state messages from the other stations to keep its
display current. A state message is generated by a station
whenever its state changes, which can occur, for example,
when a user fires a weapon or changes direction.
The first assumption made about the AF program was that
it would operate as a station on the network. This meant
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that the program would routinely process state messages on
all other vehicles in the system. Since the AF's job would
be to attack and destroy other vehicles in the simulation,
it sec-med that giving the AF state messages on all other
vehicles in the system would give the AF an unfair
advantage. It was assumed that the AF, if given perfect
information on a vehicle that was designated as a target,
would then be able to destroy that target every time.
This latter assumption resulted in an architecture that
supported a clear division of responsibilities within the AF
program. The AF program would model two basic combat
functions: it would model the process of gathering
information about events on the battlefield, and it would
model the decision-making process that interprets, and acts
upon, that information. These two functions formed the
basis for two separate research issues associated with the
development of this program. This thesis is concerned with
the first of those two issues: that of modeling observation
or perception on a battlefield. A companion thesis
discusses the decision-making funcion of the
program[P.ef. 4].
Regarding the research goal of this thesis--modeling
battlefield observation--an important distinction must be
made. The goal cf this research is not to model human
perceptive processes, such as vision and hearing. Rather,
4
it is to model the results of those processes. For example,
instead of modeling how the eye works, the goal is to model
what a person might be able to see under certain conditions.
As far as the AF is concerned, this means modeling what the
AF would be likely to know about its opponents at any given
point in time, based on several key factors. This
distinction will become clearer in Chapters II and III when
the model is Fresented.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER
In Chapter II the basic strategy for this project is
presented, along with an overview of the artificial
intelligence issues that impact on the work. Chapter III
contains a description of the proposed model for
accomplishing the goels stated in the previou3 section. fhe
model is further explained in Chapter IV with actual output
from a series of simulations using the model. In Chapter V,
the implementation of the program with its decision-making
counterpart is explained. Finally, Chapter VI concludes
with a summary of the work and a discussion of the original
assumptions and objectives.
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II. KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF
A. INTRODUCTION
The overall approach to this project is based on a real
world analogy. It is explained in this chapter, followed by
a discussion of the concepts of knowledge and belief that
are key features of the adopted strategy. Lastly, the
chapter covers reasoning with uncertainty, another issue
that is central to the successful implementation of this AF
program.
B. THE OBSERVER ANALOGY
As explained in Chapter I, the AF program is divided
along two basic functions: battlefield observation and
decision-making. Furthermore, the motivation for modeling
battlefield observation is to give the AF decision maker
information that approximates the information it would be
likely to have if it were gathering information on a real
battlefield.
On a real battlefield, information is gathered in many
ways. For instance, long range patrols roam the forward
areas and report by radio. Observation posts hidden on high
terrain features scan their assigned sectors and send in
reports by radio or field telephone. The commander may also
receive information from higher headquarters, neighboring
6
units, and allies. This information may be in the form of
photos, descriptions, map overlays, and so on. Finally, the
forward elements of the command's fighting force are also
information gatherers. Since they are likely to see the
enemy first, they can immediately report back on its size,
equipment, activities and location.
All of this information is assimilated by the decision-
maker and used to form a course of action, or to make
changes to a previously chosen course of action. The
system, therefore, consists of two subsystems: one that
gathers information, and another that uses it. The AF
program was structured in the same manner, with roughly the
same division of functions. This thesis, in particular,
attempts to model the information gathering subsystem by
simulating the reports that are sent to the decision maker
by observers. Again, a distinction alluded to in Chapter I
is relevant here: the goal is to model the results of the
observation process, not the process itself.
C. KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF
Recall from Chapter I that, without this observation
function, the AF would be free to use NPSNET world state
messages to form courses of action. It was assumed that the
AF would then have an unrealistic advantage over its
opponents. This is analogous to a real world commander who
7
has perfect information about the enemy's size, location,
equipment, amount of ammunition, level of fuel in fuel
tanks, and so on. Obviously, this is never the case. Even
very good information is not perfect. However, if the goal
here is to model the results of the observation process, how
far from perfect should the information be?
The strategy used here is to distinguish between
knowledge, that which is known to be true about something,
and beliefs, that which is believed to be true. These
concepts have been investigated by many artificial
intelligence researchers[Ref. 5], [Ref. 6],
[Ref. 7]. Davis, for example, describes three
degrees of belief possessed by an agent, such as an
autonomous agent:
1. Explicit belief -- The program believes anything that
is explicitly in the knowledge base.
2. Derivable belief -- The program believes anything that
the inference engine can derive in a retrieval.
3. Implicit belief -- the program believes anything that
could be inferred in principle via valid inference from
the knowledge base.
Implied in the concept of belief is the notion that a
belief can be wrong. Therefore, the agent should be allowed
to hold beliefs which, although supportable by the knowledge
base, are contrary to the true facts about the world.
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In the AF program, the agent's knowledge comes from two
sources: the static knowledge base that describes certain
facts and relationships about the environment, and a dynamic
knowledge base that changes with each decision cycle of a
simulation. Certain true facts about the world are allowed
to be asserted as knowledge, such as the current system time
or a vehicle identification number assigned to each vehicle
in the simulator by NPSNET. However, most of the remaining
facts about the world, such as information describing the
targets, are not asserted as knowledge. Instead, they are
processed and asserted as beliefs. The observer program
then uses knowledge and rules to determine additional
beliefs, if they exist. Finally, the beliefs are passed to
the decision maker for action.
A critical step, of course, is the part about
processing true facts about the world into beliefs. That is
the bulk of the work of this thesis. The task is
accomplished with several belief generation algorithms that
are described in Chapter III and demonstrated in Chapter IV.
Placed in the context of the observer analogy, the output of
the belief generation algorithms approximates reports that
an observer would send under a given set of conditions.
Performing the belief generation task again raises a
question introduced in the first paragraph of this section:
how far from perfect should the information be? If true
9
facts about something are to be processed into beliefs, how
much error should be introduced? More to the point, what is
a valid indicator that the belief algorithms successfully
model a real battlefield observation?
These questions were resolved in the following manner.
Rather than make the assertion "Here is how the average
battlefield observer behaves," the assumption is made that
battlefield observers in the real world may be highly
skilled and very effective, or poorly trained and
ineffective, and most of them fall somewhere in between.
The model was then designed to accommodate this range of
abilities among observers. By adjusting certain parameters
and making changes to the knowledge base, the observer can
be always right or always wrong, or it can be right or wrong
some percentage of the time. With this feature in place,
the user can control the performance of the autonomous
force. With a poor observer, the AF will be easy to beat
because the AF will be working with beliefs that are
substantially different from the true facts about the world.
But with a good observer, the AF's beliefs may be very close
to the truth, and the AF will be harder to beat.
To summarize this section, true facts about the world
are converted into beliefs by a set of belief generation
algorithms. These algorithms have parameters that can be
set to control the amount of error that is introduced. A
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knowledge base and rule base are used by the program to
derive additional beliefs from existing beliefs. The
output from the observer subsystem is sent to the decision
maker for action.
D. REASONING WITH UNCERTAINTY
The final section of this chapter covers a few
reasoning issues that are central to the successful
implementation of this model.
The observer program discussed in the previous section
can be thought of as an expert system that predicts what a
human observer's report would be under a given set of
circumstances. At any given instant in time, the system
must choose a belief about something from among several
possible beliefs, all of which may be equally valid. For
example, if the true state of a vehicle is that it is
traveling at 32 kilometers per hour, then when is a belief
of 30 kph more appropriate than a belief of 28 kph? An
additional problem with modeling a real world observer is
that no one, not even the observer, can predict with
certainty what his or her next report will be.
This is a standard problem that has been characterized
by many researchers as reasoning with uncertainty
[Ref. 8], [Ref. 9], [Ref. 10]. In general, reasoning with
uncertainty means having to form a conclusion about
Ii
something based on incomplete or incorrect information. In
some applications, such as medical diagnosis, the system
must undertake a complex reasoning process to arrive at a
conclusion that may only have a certain probability of being
right[Ref. 11].
The AF application is not as complex as medical
diagnosis, but it still requires the use of uncertain
reasoning techniques to resolve ambiguities. For example,
what would an observer really report? And what would
constitute a realistic approximation of that report?
The strategy adopted in this application uses several
standard techniques for dealing with these issues. However,
they are best explained in the context of the model.
Therefore, further explanation is reserved for the next
chapter.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter developed the analogy of the combat
observer sending reports to a decision maker as the basis
for the division of functions within the overall AF program.
It further portrayed the observation function as a model of
the combat observation subsystem in the real world.
However, the distinction was made that this program attempts
to model the results of the observation process, not the
process itself.
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This led to a discussion of the basic strategy used by
this program to accomplish its goal: the conversion of true
facts about the world state into beliefs using a set of
belief generation algorithms, a knowledge base, and a set of
rules. This process is the heart of this entire program.
Next, the chapter covered several related issues concerning
the concepts of knowledge and belief, and the use of
uncertain reasoning techniques.
In the next chapter, the model and its parameters are
laid out in detail. Chapter IV contains a demonstration of
its implementation on NPSNET.
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III. SIMULATING A BATTLEFIELD OBSERVER
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the mechanism for converting true facts
about the world into beliefs is explained in detail. It
begins with a discussion of conditions on a battlefield that
affect a human observer's performance, as well as individual
aspects of the observer that affect how well he or she would
perform under any circumstances. The chapter then covers
the manner in which the battlefield conditions are combined
into a formula that captures the overall effect of the
conditions upon the belief generation process. With this
formula in place, the functions that compute the actual
beliefs can be shown.
Also covered in this chapter are the basic
characteristics of objects in NPSNET. These characteristics
constitute the true facts about the world that this program
converts into beliefs. Finally, the inference procedures
that derive new beliefs based on the results of the
algorithms are covered in detail. There is also a feature
for determining new beliefs based on beliefs from a previous
decision cycle.
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B. MODELING BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS
A total of five battlefield conditions are simulated in
this program. They are distance, visibility, judgement,
knowledge, and equipment. Each of them is explained in this
section. Basically, distance and visibility are meant to
represent the physical characteristics of the combat
environment, while knowledge and judgement apply to the
individual observer. Equipment is related to the observer's
capabilities since it denotes any items of equipment used to
aid the observation process.
In theory, almost anything can be regarded as an
important battlefield factor: the amount of time since the
observer's last meal, the amount of sleep in the prior 24
hours, the actions of the objects that are being observed,
knowledge about the combat environment in which they are
operating, and so on. Since the automated force program
must operate in real time, it is not desirable to try to
model every condition under which people make judgements on
a battlefield.
Distance. Denoted by d, it is a number between 0 and 1
that is based on the actual distance between the observer
and the target. A value of 1 means the object is so close
that it can be positively identified with the naked eye, a
value of 0 means that there is no chance that the attribute
can be identified. Choosing to model this battlefield
15
condition rests on an assumption that distant objects are
much harder to identify than relatively close objects. In
Section E, a formula will be presented that shows how d is
computed, given the actual distance to the target.
Visibility. Denoted by v, it is a value between 0 and
1 that describes atmospheric conditions, such as darkness,
fog, smoke, dust. It is important to note that this factor
covers anything that impacts on visibility, to include time
of day. A value of 0 for v denotes the poorest conditions,
such as a moonless night or impenetrable fog, when
visibility may be less than 30 feet. v = 1 means perfect
viewing conditions, when visibility may be 5,000 meters or
more with the naked eye. Values between 0 and 1 denote
various visibility ranges. By default, a simulation begins
with a visibility of 1, assuming a daylight battle in a
clear desert environment. However, the presence of smoke,
dust, and haze can change that value during a simulation.
Also, a user of NPSNET can change the visibility via menu
selection during a simulation.
Judgement. Denoted by j, a value between 0 and 1 is
used to represent the skill and experience of the observer.
This can include the observer's eyesight, alertness,
intelligence, enthusiasm about the mission, and so on. The
number is subjectively set, with 1 representing a highly-
skilled observer, and 0 meaning the opposite. Although
16
judgement is an important individual characteristic, it does
not influence AF performance as much as some other
characteristics, such as knowledge or equipment. The
default value is j = 1.0.
Knowledge. Denoted by k, this value also falls between
0 and 1. It is a measure of what the observer knows,
through prior knowledge or external sources, about the
objects being observed. If knowledge is 1, then the true
facts are always known to the observer, and are asserted as
beliefs with a value of 1, which has the same effect as
asserting them as knowledge. A value of 0 means that the
observer has no relevant knowledge about the objects it
sees. The default value is 0.5.
Equipment. Denoted by q, this is a measure of the
utility of various pieces of equipment available to the
observer for viewing the battlefield, such as binoculars,
night vision devices, and so on. The naked eye is denoted
by a value of 0, and 1 means that the equipment used
provides maximum utility. By default, the observer has
binoculars and night vision equipment. The value of q
changes during the simulation as the observer uses different
equipment in different situations. If desired, the user can
take away the equipment at startup, forcing the observer to
use only the naked eye.
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The factors described above are designed to represent
only the most fundamental battlefield conditions. Notice
that noise is not accounted for, even though battlefield
sounds provide significant clues to identifying things.
However, noise and other factors will be discussed in the
final chapter as issues for future program development.
C. THE OBSERVER MODEL
This section explains how the five battlefield
conditions, Table I, are combined into a single parameter
that represents the overall effect of those conditions upon
the belief generator's output.








A function, denoted as m, represents the total effect
of d, v, j, k, and q. m(d,v,j,k,q) is interpreted as a
probabilistic measure of the ability of the observer to make
18
a correct observation ;nder the specified conditions. m
itself must fall between 0 and 1, since it is a measure of
probability. If m is low, then there is relatiiely little
chance that the observer will observe and correctly identify
selected attributes of an object. If m is high, then there
is a relatively greater chance that the observer's report
will be accurate. Output generated by the observer module
becomes input to the decision maker. This means that when m
is low, the decision maker will probably be working with
poor information. However, it will be shown that m rises as
the AF gets closer to its target, so the decision maker gets
better and better information with each decision cycle.
Since the probability function m is somewhat unwieldy
in its entirety, some of the factors are combined into
intermediate functions denoted by the letters c and g. The
functions are shown here and then explained in turn.
c(d,v,j)=d2e-,%1 - v X = 0.5 (1)
g(c, q) =c+q(l-c) 2 - (2)
m(g, k) =gl-k (3)
Equation (1) depicts a multiplicative relationship
between d, v, and j. In order to have c = 1, all three must
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equal 1. The desire here was for these three parameters to
have a strong combined effect on m, but that one of them
alone could not force m to equal 1. This is based on an
intuitive interpretation of these parameters. For instance,
judgement alone should not result in perfect knowledge,
clear visibility alone should not lead to a perfect
observation, and close proximity should not automatically
result in a perfect observation because the observer can
make a mistake even at close range. However, the combined
effect of thes:e three parameters, which is c, will always
force m to 1.
The next two functions will be discussed together. In
function g(c,q), Equation (2), the relationship between c
and q is such that if either of these is 1, then g = 1.
Then, in m(g,k), the same relationship holds for g and k.
The overall effect is that either knowledge, or equipment,
or the combined effects of distance, visibility, and
judgement can produce the result m = I. This supports the
goal that m should be 1 when knowledge is 1, and it also
supports the intuitive notion that the use of equipment has
a dramatic effect on the abilities of the observer. For
example, using binoculars enables observation of distant




In this section, the key characteristics of NPSNET
vehicles are discussed. The values of these characteristics
come to the AF program via world state messages and are
ultimately converted to beliefs by the battlefield
observation program.
Table II, next page, shows the contents of a state
message. These messages are generated on startup and when
there are changes to predetermined aspects of a vehicle's
state, such as its speed and direction. Between state
messages, the AF program must apply its own dead reckoning
algorithm to keep track of the locations of vehicles in the
simulation.
As stated above some items of information from the
state message are asserted as facts without belief
processing; namely, the system time and the vehicle ID. In
addition, certain other items are ignored, such as the
elevation of the target's gun and chassis. For one thing,
it is not likely that these would ever be known by an
observer. Also, a combat force does not have a need for
such detailed information about its opponents.
21
Table II: CONTENT OF STATE MESSAGE
Field Name Description Values




int vehno unique ID for each
object in the
simulation




int gunfire 0 = has not fired
1 = has fired
int alive 0 = dead
1 = alive
float pos[3] location of vehicle x = east-west axis
in 3D world y = vertical axis,
coordinates, using or elevation
the right-handed z = north-south
coordinate system axis
float direction the direction the 0 - 359 compass
vehicle is heading degrees
float viewdirection the direction in 0 - 359 compass
which the vehicle degrees, relative
is looking, or the to direction
turret state
float elev elevation of
chassis
float gunelev elevation of main
gun, relative to
chassis
float speed speed in kilometers 0 to max speed
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The remaining elements of the state message are divided
into two groups: those that are continuously-valued in
nature, and those that are discretely-valued. A
continuously-valued element, or target attribute, is one
that has a range of allowable values. These are location,
speed, direction, and view direction. A discretely-valued
attribute is one that has only a few allowable values. This
list includes vehicle type, gunfire, and alive. The need
for this division of target characteristics will become
apparent later in this chapter.
Finally two other discretely-valued attributes about a
target are considered: armament and armor-protection. These
are not contained in the state message but are implied by
the vehicle type of the target. For example, if the target
is a tank, then it will have a main-gun and it will be an
armored vehicle. These additional target attributes are
used in the inference process that determines beliefs about
discretely-valued attributes.
E. DETERMINING THE DISTANCE FACTOR
This section is devoted to an explanation of the
formula used to compute the distance parameter, which is one
of the five battlefield factors. The computation of d is
unique in that it is not the same for all target
characteristics.
23
First of all, an assumption is made that some target
attributes are harder to identify than others. For example,
at a range of 4,000 meters, determining which way the turret
of a tank is facing is harder than judging the general
direction in which the tank is heading. Or, if a vehicle is
stationary, it might be hard to tell if it is alive or dead.
Therefore, it was desirable that m should be given the
chance to assume different values when generating beliefs
about different target attributes. To accomplish this goal,
the formula for computing d is given inputs that may vary
according to the target attribute that is being evaluated.
As noted earlier, d is a number between 0 and 1, and
is based on the distance from the observer to the target.
When d = 1, it means that an attribute of a target is so
close that it can be positively identified. For each
attribute, a value, dl, represents the range, in meters, at
which that attribute can be positively identified. do
represents the range at which the attribute can just begin
to be seen, but is not likely to be identified accurately.
Table III lists these distance values for the various target
attributes.
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To obtain d for an attribute of interest, the values
for d. and d, for that attribute are entered into (4) below.
d = 1 - da - d,(attribute) (4)
d o (attribute) - d 1 (attribute)
where d, is the actual distance from the observer to the
target. To illustrate, if an object is 2,000 meters away,
and the observer is trying to determine if it is an armored
vehicle, as opposed to a truck, then d would have a value
of,
da - d1 (armor) 2000 - 550 = 0.33
d o (armor) - d1 (armor) 5000 - 550
but if the observer were trying to judge the direction in
which the vehicle was heading, then d would be,
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da - d(direction) 2000 - 1000 014
d. (direction) - d, (direction) 8000 - 1000
If the other factors are held constant, then the
difference in d for the two examples above will result in a
slightly higher m in the second case. (Remember, higher
values of d are more favorable.) This means that the
observer has a slightly better chance of judging a vehicle's
direction of travel than of determining whether or not the
vehicle is armored.
F. THE BELIEF GENERATION ALGORITHMS
This section covers the procedures that convert true
facts about the world state into beliefs. Beliefs for most
of the target attributes are computed by a single function
that receives as inputs a true state value for an attribute
and the m value for that attribute. Some of the target
attributes are more complex, requiring a series of functions
and rules. For each target attribute there is also a
procedure for determining a belief based on a previous
belief. This supports the idea that old beliefs influence
new beliefs.
In the first part of this section, the belief
generation algorithms for location, speed, direction and
view direction will be presented. Following that are the
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procedures for determining beliefs about vehicle type,
armament, armor-protection, gunfire, and alive.
1. Selecting Beliefs for Continuously-valued
Attributes
Beliefs in this category are computed with
probabilistic algorithms that introduce error directly into
the true value to obtain a belief. Since the value, ma, is
interpreted as the probability of an observer correctly
identifying attribute a, then 1 - ma is the chance of error
in the observation. For instance, if m = 0.85, then there
could be as much as a 15 percent error in the observation.
The question is, 15 percent of what? For each attribute the
error is introduced in a slightly different way, but in each
case the result is a random selection based on m. The
following subsections will cover the procedure for each of
the attributes in the continuously valued category.
a. Speed
The arguments to the speed error function are
msPed and the actual speed of the target. First, 1 - m is
used to determine an interval around the actual speed value.
For example, if 1 - m = 0.2, and the true speed is 25
kilometers per hour, then the resulting interval will be as
follows
lb = 25 - 0.2(25) = 20 kph
ub = 25 + 0.2(25) = 30 kph
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A value is then selected at random from this
interval. This scheme has the desired characteristic that
the true speed always has a chance of being selected, and it
has a greater chance as m increases. Also, when the target
is moving faster, a given percentage of error will be
greater since the percentage is applied to a higher value.
The method just described is used to
calculate the initial belief in speed. However, there is a
chance that an observer's initial belief about an
observation will influence later beliefs. To accommodate
this possibility, subsequent speed belief calculations use a
function that receives as arguments the actual speed and the
previous speed belief. The interval from which the random
selection is made is the interval formed by taking the
absolute value of the current true speed subtracted from the
last belief. This means that when a target's speed is
constant, the successive beliefs stand a good chance of
being closer and closer to the actual speed. This
characteristic of the algorithm agrees with the notion that,
if the observer views an object moving at a constant speed
for a long time (perhaps several seconds), then the observer
will be more likely to figure out, or guess, the correct
speed.
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b. Direction and View Direction
Since these two attribute beliefs are
computed in an identical manner, they will be presented
together. The arguments to the compass error function are m
and the true direction in which the target is traveling. A
compass error in percentage terms is interpreted as a
percentage of the entire compass, i.e. 360 degrees.
Therefore the error, 1 - m, is converted to an error in
degrees as follows:
error = 360(1 - m)
The error is then added to, and subtracted
from, the true error to form an interval from which a value
is selected. This value becomes the initial belief about
direction. Subsequent beliefs are selected at random from
the interval formed by taking the difference between the
current true value and the most recent belief. For example,
if the true value is 255 degrees at time t,, and the belief
at time t. was 315 degrees, then the interval from which the
new belief is selected would be 315 - 255 = 60. Note that
there can be two interpretations of the difference between
two directions on a compass. For example, the difference
between 315 degrees and 255 degrees could also be 300. In
this application, the smaller difference is always chosen.
This algorithm again has the characteristic
that, if direction remains constant for a period of time,
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the beliefs will gravitate toward the true value. The same
arguments discussed above apply here.
c. Location
The location error algorithm is the most
complex, and the most important, of the continuously valued
belief generation algorithms. Of all target
characteristics, the location of the target is the most
critical as far as the AF is concerned. The true location
of a target must eventually be known if the AF is ever to
successfully attack that target. This is different from a
real world combat system, where a tank gunner, for instance,
can hit a target by aiming at it. The gunner does not need
to know the grid coordinates of the enemy tank. The AF, of
course, does not have a human aiming mechanism. Its "cross-
hairs," so to speak, are the grid coordinates of the target.
For these reasons, the generation of location
beliefs is really an attempt to model the effectiveness of a
tank gunner. If a gunner is 90 percent effective, then it
means that he hits his target 90 percent of the time. In
the AF program, this could be simulated by giving the AF the
correct grid coordinates 90 percent of the time. Of course,
the AF has other internal criteria that must be met before
it can hit a target, such as range and line-of-sight.
However, if these criteria are satisfied, and the AF is
30
given the correct location of a target (and all of this
information is current)', it will always hit the target.
The location belief algorithm is designed to
model gunner effectiveness by giving the AF the correct
location a certain percentage of the time. Its arguments
are miocation, the true X coordinate and the true Z coordinate.
(Note: The Y coordinate denotes elevation in the NPSNET
world coordinate system.) The function returns a set of
believed X and Z coordinates.
The basis for the error is 1 - m. Error in
location is interpreted as a percentage of the distance
between the AF and the target. If the target is 1000 meters
from the AF, and 1 - m = 0.05, then
error = 0.05(1000) = 50 meters
A random number selected from the interval
[0, 50] would become the actual error contained in the
belief. However, there is an additional step. In order to
compute X and Z coordinates for the believed location, a
direction from the target is chosen at random and then used,
along with the distance, to determine the believed
coordinates.
The information may not be current if the network becomes
overloaded. This is an implementation problem that will be
discussed in Chapter V.
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The direction to the target is only chosen at
random during the initial belief calculation. So that a
series of beliefs are consistent with each other, subsequent
beliefs are chosen, randomly, from an area that is in the
same general direction as the initial belief. The distance
factor for subsequent beliefs is chosen from an interval
formed by taking the difference between the current location
and the previous belief. As with the other belief
algorithms, subsequent beliefs gravitate toward the true
belief as long as the location is unchanged.
This section covered the procedures for
determining beliefs about the four continuously-valued
attributes. In each case, a percentage of error was applied
in some manner to the true value of the attribute. The
actual result was a random choice.
2. Selecting Beliefs for Discretely-valued Attributes
This section is concerned with the vehicle type,
gunfire, and alive target attributes that are elements of
the NPSNET world state message. The alive attribute is
important to the AF because if a target is dead, it should
be withdrawn from the target list. The gunfire attribute is
useful, but not critical at this stage of AF development
because the AF does not attempt to "dodge" incoming rounds
or take cover. Finally, the vehicle type attribute is
another item for future development of the program. At
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present, the AF will attack any vehicle that is asserted as
a target. However, some targets, such as a tank, should be
given greater priority than others, such as a truck. Also,
if the AF is to follow international protocols, then it
should not attack ambulances or other medical aid vehicles.
Since these features are all possibilities for
future development of the AF, they have been included in the
belief generation program and will be discussed in this
section. Although these procedures have been implemented in
the program, they can be effectively turned off to save
computation time.
The procedure for generating discretely-valued
attribute beliefs is a multi-step process that uses several
functions, rules, and facts from the knowledge base. The
basic strategy is to compute intermediate beliefs for one or
two selected attributes and then treat the intermediate
beliefs as evidence to support other beliefs. To support
this strategy, it was necessary to designate additional
target characteristics that could be used for generating
intermediate beliefs. The attributes, armament and armor
protection, were chosen for this purpose. Although they are
not included in the NPSNET world state message, they are
useful for making inferences about the vehicle type and
gunfire attributes.
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These special target attributes have values that
are associated with one or more categories or families of
vehicles. For example, all of the varieties of tanks
modeled in NPSNET belong to the family of tanks. Armored
vehicles that carry troops to combat belong to the armored
personnel carrier family, and so on. This data, provided in
Table Table IV represents the armament and armor protection
attributes.
Table IV: INTERMEDIATE ATTRIBUTE VALUES
Attribute: Armament
Value Vehicle Type Category
main-gun tank
small-arms apc (armored personnel carrier)
anti-armor itv (improved TOW vehicle)
arms-none truck
Attribute: Armor Protection
Value Vehicle Type Category
has-armor tank, apc, itv
no-armor truck
When an NPSNET world state message is received by
the observer program, the value of the vehicle type
attribute is checked against lists of vehicle types stored
in the observer's knowledge base. If the vehicle is a tank,
then the facts about the tank's armament and armor
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protection will be asserted. Namely, that the vehicle has a
main-gun and it is an armored vehicle. These'new facts are
then treated as true world state facts and are subject to
belief computations.
Because of the nature of discretely-valued
attributes, a selection method like the one described in
Subsection 1 is not appropriate. For one thing, if an
attribute has only two or three allowable values, selecting
a belief by computing a percentage error based on the true
value is inappropriate. Also, the method described in the
previous subsection does not exploit the fact that some
attributes lend themselves to inference. Instead of using
the methods described previously, an evidential reasoning
technique based on Dempster-Shafer theory is used to take
advantage of the fact that discrete attributes can be both
observed and inferred[Ref. 12],[Ref. 13].
Dempster-Shafer theory is a mathematical, non-Bayesian
theory for combining multiple pieces of evidence to develop
beliefs in various hypotheses. It features a tableau
mechanism that is especially suited to combining the types
of evidence considered by this belief generation procedure.
To illustrate the use of this technique, and the overall
procedure, the next several paragraphs will be devoted to
generating a belief about vehicle type.
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The first step is to calculate m for all
discretely valued attributes, to include the intermediate
attributes. Each m is then evaluated as evidence supporting
the actual value of the attribute, and 1 - m is assigned to
the complement of the true value. For example, if armor
protection is being considered, and marmor 0.75, then the
following evidence would be generated and labeled m,:
m.({armor:has-armor}) = 0.75
m 1({armor:no-armor}) = 0.25
Likewise, if the vehicle type is tank, and
mvehtype =0.85, then:
m1 ({vehtype:tank}) = 0.85
m1 ({vehtype:apc,itv,truck}) = 0.15
For each attribute, mi is the label assigned to
evidence based on direct observation of the attribute, since
it is derived from m, and m itself is the probability that
an attribute was observed and identified correctly.
After mi has been determined for each attribute,
certain rules are activated that try to apply facts in the
knowledge base to existing evidence. For example, two of
the facts are:
(has-armor (tank apc itv) 1.0)
(no-armor (truck) 1.0),
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where the numerical value, called p, is the probability that
the first term in the fact implies the second term. These
particular facts say that the presence of armor plating on a
target implies that the target is either a tank, or an apc,
or an itv, with p = 1, and the absence of armor implies that
the target is a truck, also with p = 1. This may seem
redundant, since the associations between these attributes
was just given. Remember, however, that the original data
was asserted as true facts, and now the program is computing
beliefs.
When facts in the knowledge base are matched with
existing evidence, new evidence is asserted that contains a
numerical value found by multiplying m, with p. Using the
armor protection implications given above, the new facts
would be:
(belief (has-armor) implies (tank apc itv) 0.75)
(belief (no-armor) implies (truck) 0.25)
These new implication facts trigger another set of
rules that gather all updated facts about the target
attributes and labels that as evidence M2. m 2 evidence is
any evidence in support of a particular belief that is
inferred by the presence of another belief. Using the
examples thus far, M 2 evidence would include evidence that
says something about vehicle type because of the beliefs in
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armor protection shown above. This is an illustration of
how an intermediate belief is used in the belief generation
process. Recall that the purpose of this example is to
generate a belief in vehicle type. Thus far, the list of
evidence about vehicle type consists of:
m1 ({vehtype:tank}) = 0.85
m1 ({vehtype:apc,itv,truck}) = 0.15
m2 ({vehtype:tank,apc,itv}) = 0.75
m2 ({vehtype:truck)) = 0.25
The next step is to combine this evidence to form
a belief about vehicle type. An intersection tableau is a
convenient tool for this. Figure 1 is a simple graph where
the evidence to be combined is placed in the margins. For
this example, the left margin contains the m, evidence and







Figure 1: Use of intersection tableau to combine evidence
values.
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The data inside the tableau consist of the
intersections of the sets and the product of the values
associated with each set. for example, {tank) 0.6375 was
obtained by taking the intersection of {tank} and
{tank,apc,itv}, and the product 0.75 x 0.85.
The values are then normalized by first totaling
the empty sets and subtracting that amount from 1. In the
notation provided by the Dempster-Shafer model, this would
be:
m1 x m2({}) = 0.2125
1C = 1 - Mi x m2({} = 0.7875
The second step in normalization is to divide the
values of the non-empty sets in the tableau by K :
m, ( m2 ({tankl) = 0.6375/0.7875 = 0.8095
m! @ m2 ({apc,itv}) = 0.Il2/0.7875 = 0.1428
m! 0 M2 ({truck}) = 0.0375/0.7875 = 0.0476
The final step in the belief generation procedure
is to treat the results of the intersection tableau as
weights in a random selection process. In this case, a
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number chosen at random from 1 to 100 would be compared to
each of the tableau results. If the numb- 81 or less,
then tank would be chosen as the belief fo vehicle type.
If the number is between 82 and 96, then either apr or itv
would be chosen (at random); and if the original random
number was between 97 and 100, truck would be chosen as the
belief. One of the advantages of this belief generation
procedure is that it uses a method of logical inference to
determine weights, but then provides for human error by
allowing random selection. In the example above, the
observer could mistakenly call the tank a truck.
The remaining discretely valued attributes--
gunfire and alive--are also computed using a comktination of
functions, rules and random selection. All of the
discretely valued attributes have many inter-relationships.
For example, if the value of gunfire is "firing," then that
implies something about armament, armor protection, vehicle
type, and alive. Although only one example was shown here,
the program goes through this process for all of the
attributes in this category.
A controlled degree of random selection is
important when determining these beliefs because it allows
the unpredictable to occur. In a combat environment, for
example, people often misidentify things that are spotted on
the battlefield. One of the goals in this project was to
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simulate logical errors, such as mistaking an apc for a
tank, as well as judgmental errors that occur in the
battlefield observation process.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter covered the functions and procedures that
model the battlefield observation process. It described the
battlefield conditions that are combined into a value called
m that is a probabilistic measure of the accuracy of an
observation. It then covered the ways that m is used to
calculate continuously valued and discretely valued target
attribute beliefs.
In the next chapter, an analysis of actual data
generated by the continuously-valued belief algorithms is
presented and discussed.
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IV. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, several detailed examples are used to
show how the belief algorithms work in an actual simulation.
Since continuously valued attributes have the greatest
impact on autonomous force (AF) behavior, they will be the
focus of this chapter.
The first three examples are devoted to explaining the
location belief algorithm, which is the most critical belief
that is generated by the program. That is because, to the
AF, the location of a target is the most important piece of
information needed to conduct a successful attack. The last
two examples in the chapter are devoted to belief algorithms
for speed, heading and view direction.
The examples are presented as a series of engagements
pitting an AF of four tanks against various targets in the
simulator. Output from the simulations was captured in a
file and is used here to show the workings of the model.
Before describing the engagements, a word about the targets
is necessary.
Vehicles and other moving objects in NPSNET are
controlled in one of four ways: scripted, driven,
uncontrolled, and autonomous. When the simulator is
started, the "world" is initially populated with an
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assortment of scripted and uncontrolled vehicles. The user
can "drive" a vehicle by selecting a two-dimensional vehicle
icon with a mouse pointer. The vehicle selected then
becomes a driven vehicle. At any time, the user may start
the AF program. As far as the AF is concerned, any driven
vehicle is a target. Scripted, uncontrolled, and other
autonomous vehicles are ignored, with one key exception. If
a user leaves a driven vehicle to drive a new vehicle, the
previous vehicle becomes uncontrolled, that is, the settings
chosen by the driver, such as speed and direction, remain in
effect. However, the AF platoon will continue to treat that
uncontrolled vehicle as a target. Once a vehicle becomes a
target, it remains a target until it is either destroyed or
it moves out of range.
B. EXAMPLE ONE
Most of the "battles" in this series of examples occur
on flat terrain characterized by good line-of-sight for
distances of several thousand meters. Under these
conditions, the AF's requirements for attacking a target--
range of 5,000 meters or less and no obstacles--will be
easily met.
As explained in Chapter III, the five parameters used
by the belief algorithm are combined into a value labeled m
that represents the probability that an observation is
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correct, given the conditions under which the observation is
made. Also, 1 - m is the amount of error that could be
present. In other words, if there is a 98 percent chance
that an observation is correct, then there may be as much as
a two percent error in the observation. When m is 1.0, then
the observation is perfect, which means the belief matches
the actual data. Three things can cause m to equal 1.0:
1. If knowledge (k) = 1.0, then m = 1.0
2. If equipment (q) = 1.0, then m = 1.0
3. If judgement (j) and visibility (v) and distance (d)
all equal 1.0, then m = 1.0
In Figure 2, the parameters have been set so that
belief generation is effectively turned off. That is, m is
always 1.0, thus illustrating how the AF performs when it is
passed perfect information.
KNOWLEDGE TO BELIEF CONVERSION
No distortion of facts.
k, v, j, q = 1.0
Line Actual Data Beliefs
Number Veh 0 TL.e Type Range Xcoord Zcoord Xcoord Zccord
3: 1' 36.58 52 1841.65 35843.35 25290.90 35843.35 2529.90 :.Co
2. 31 177C''.59 52 1799.80 35850.96 25298.42 35850.96 25298.42 1.00
3. 31 P77016.27 52 i752.89 35862.90 25310.87 35862.90 25310.87 :.00
4. 31 177020.87 152 1713.22 35867.81 25317.81 35867.8: 25317.81 1.00
Figure 2: Data from Example 1 of simulation.
The following column descriptions are provided:
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1. Line Number -- The line number of the output.
2. Veh ID -- This is a unique number assigned by NPSNET to
each vehicle that is present in a given simulation.
When a vehicle is destroyed, its number remains unused
for the rest of the simulation.
3. Time -- The system time, useful for measuring elapsed
time from the start of an engagement.
4. Type -- The type of vehicle, such as tank, truck, etc.
5. Range -- Range in meters from the attacking platoon to
the target.
6. Actual Data -- True location of the target in the
NPSNET world coordinate system, in which X represents
width, Z represents depth, and Y represents height.
Only X and Z are shown here.
7. Beliefs -- The believed location of the target.
8. m -- The probability that a belief matches the truth.
1 - m is the amount of error that may be introduced.
The first engagement begins with the AF attacking
Vehicle Number 31 from a range of 1841.65 meters. Notice
that m = 1.0. As expected, X and Z coordinates in the
Beliefs column are identical to those in the Actual Data
column. The type of target is denoted by the number 52,
which, in NPSNET, is an armored vehicle called a BMP.
However, the fourth line of output lists the vehicle type as
152. This is simply NPSNET's symbol for a destroyed BMP.
By convention, the graphical picture of a destroyed vehicle
is denoted with a number that is easily related to the type
designation of its live counterpart, such as 52 and 152.
The point here is that the presence of type 152 in the
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fourth line means that Vehicle Number 31 is destroyed as of
that point in the program.
The elapsed time was about 14 seconds from the start of
the engagement until the target was destroyed. It was
destroyed at a range of 1713.22 meters. Not shown in the
output is the speed of the target, which was under five
kilometers per hour. The target was also shooting at, and
missing, the AF platoon.
Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for a
human opponent to survive an engagement with a AF platoon
before being destroyed. The next example shows how a small
degree of knowledge-to-belief conversion can give an
opponent more time to respond to the AF attack.
C. EXAMPLE TWO
The parameter settings and data for Example 2 are shown
in Figure 3. In this and the following example the format
of the output has been changed to emphasize the important
information. The column labeled Error is the difference, in
meters, between the target's true location and its believed
location. The next column, %Error, is the amount of actual
error in percentage terms. This is obtained by dividing
Error by Range. This simulation begins at a range of
4307.49 meters, Line Number 1, Lt which point m = 0.76, thus
introducing as much as a 24 percent error. Actual error was
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KNOWLEDGE TO BELIEF CONVERSION
Introducing location error into the SAF input.
k = 0.8 v = 1.0 j = 1.0 q = 0.0
Line
Number Veh ID Time T Range Error %Error m
1. 31 697819.81 52 4307.49 646.12 ".15 0.76
2. 31 697826.37 52 4276.28 983.54 0.23 0.76
3. 31 697832.94 52 4241.68 424.17 0.10 0.77
4. 31 697840.56 52 4196.54 713.41 0.17 0.77
5. 31 697847.25 52 4152.86 705.99 0.17 0.77
6. 31 697855.69 52 4094.70 286.63 0.07 0.78
7. 31 697862.75 52 4043.01 80.86 0.02 0.78
8. 31 697869.75 52 3959.66 277.18 0.07 0.79
9. 31 697876.75 52 3876.25 697.73 0.18 0.80
10. 31 697883.69 52 3781.48 37.81 0.01 0.80
11. 31 697890.87 52 3695.81 110.87 0.03 0.81
12. 31 697898.25 52 3607.91 216.47 0.06 0.82
13. 31 697905.25 52 3512.23 210.73 0.0t 0.82
14. 31 697912.37 52 3405.96 204.36 0.06 0.83
15. 31 697920.06 52 3291.32 526.61 0.16 0.84
16. 31 697927.81 52 3199.02 319.90 0.10 0.85
17. 31 697935.69 52 3091.49 0.00 0.00 0.85
18. 31 697945.06 52 2979.85 89,40 0.03 0.86
19. 31 697954.25 52 2870.44 373.16 0.13 0.87
20. 31 697963.19 52 2758.47 165.51 0.06 0.88
21. 31 697972.06 52 2639.45 158.37 0.06 0.88
22. 31 697982.94 52 2501.11 275.12 0.11 0.89
23. 31 697995.44 52 2370.35 71.11 0.03 0.90
24. 31 698009.12 52 2180.75 152.65 0.07 0.91
25. 31 698020.06 52 2029.27 20.29 0.01 0.92
26. 31 698034.00 52 1836.28 73.45 0.04 0.93
27. 31 698042.37 52 1683.18 100.99 0.06 0.94
28. 31 698052.00 52 1549.43 0.00 0.00 0.95
29. 31 698060.62 52 1455.46 43.66 0.03 0.96
30. 31 698069.12 52 1347.98 40.44 0.03 0.96
31. 31 698078.50 52 1213.91 36.42 0.03 0.97
32. 31 698088.25 52 1087.70 21.75 0.02 0.98
33. 31 698097.62 152 966.37 9.66 0.01 0.99
Figure 3: Output from second example.
15 percent, and the error in meters was 646.12. Computing
the initial location belief is a four step process. These
steps are outline below.
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1. Calculate a value for distance (d) based on:
dactual = 4307.49
do = 700 -- pos-d0 , in Table Table III
d, = 8000 -- pos-d
di 1 dactuai d
Thus, d = 0.5058 for Line Number 1 of Example 2.






As explained in Chapter III, the parameters to m are
combined in three intermediate functions (1), (2), (3).
Using the data above, the result is m = 0.76 for Line
Number 1, Example 2.
3. Calculate the straight line distance from the AF to the
target. The eventual error will be a percentage of
this distance. Then calculate an interval from which a
random value may be selected. From Chapter III,
Subsection F.l.c, this would be the interval [0, 1 -
m(distance to target)]. This randomization is a
critical step in giving the AF a chance, even if a
remote one, of hitting its target at almost any range.
For Line 1 of this example, 1 - m = 0.24, and the
distance is 4307.49 meters. The maximum error, then,
is 0.24 x 4307.49 = 1033.79 meters. However, the
actual error chosen at random from the interval [0,
1033.79] was 646.12, representing a percentage error of
15 percent.
4. Determine the believed X and Z coordinates by chosing a
direction at random from the interval [0, 359] and then
using polar arithmetic to obtain the coordinates of the
point that is r = 646.12 meters from the target. (Note
that the direction in compass degrees must be converted
to direction on a standard x,y plane.) This output is
not shown in the example.
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The preceding four steps illustrate the general
procedure for computing an initial belief about the location
of the target. Thereafter, previous beliefs are taken into
consideration. Instead of selecting a direction each time
from the interval [0, 3591, the the algorithm considers the
direction from the target to the previous belief when
computing a new belief. The new direction is chosen from a
narrower interval, 45 degrees, maintaining consistency from
one belief to the next. The distance factor, however, is
still determined by applying 1 - m to the actual distance
from the AF to the target.
In Example 2 the target was moving at the same speed as
in Example 1; however, the AF had a much harder time
destroying its target. In Example 1, the AF was able to
destroy its target from a range of 1713.22 meters. But from
a comparable range in Example 2, 1683.18 meters on Line 27,
the AF had to contend with a six percent error. Since the
AF tanks had line-of-sight, they were firing at the target,
but they were firing at the wrong location. The AF's
missiles could be observed landing near the belief instead
of the true target. Obviously, this favors the AF's
opponent, who now has much more time to destroy the AF
platoon before being destroyed.
Notice in the Error column that some of the entries
equal 0. such as Lines 17 and 28. This means that, due to
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the randomization of m, the AF had perfect knowledge at
those points in time. Theoretically, the target could have
been destroyed at those times. However, even though the AF
was firing throughout most of this engagement, it may not
have fired at that particular moment due to some obstacle in
the terrain, such as a small hill. Or it may have fired,
and missed, due to the age of its information, or due to
evasive action by the target. Because of network backlogs,
the AF sometimes makes decisions based on information that
may be too old to be of value. So, even though the belief
matches the actual value that came into the program, the
actual value itself may be outdated. This implementation
problem is discussed in Chapter V.
Line 33 of the output shows the destroyed vehicle type.
Even though actual error was one percent, that was
sufficiently small to allow a hit.
D. EXAMPLE THREE
Example 3 is very similar to the previous example. The
key difference is that knowledge (k) = 0.3, which means that
the AF will have less of a chance of scoring a hit in the
early stages of the battle. This is evident from Line 2 of
the output, shown in Figure 4.
At a range of 4273.60 meters, m = 0.39, and the actual
percentage error was 34 percent for a distance error of more
50
KNOWLEDGE TO BELIEF CONVERSION
Introducing greater location error into the SAF input.
k = 0.3 v = 1.0 j =1.0 q=0.0
Line
Number Veh ID Time Tvpe Range Error %Error m
1. 29 698729.37 53 4343.81 2041.59 0.47 0.38
2. 29 698737.94 53 4273.60 1453.02 0.34 0.39
3. 29 698748.94 53 4185.36 1883.41 0.45 0.40
4. 29 698757.62 53 4114.15 863.97 0.21 0.41
5. 29 698766.94 53 4037.62 1493.92 0.37 0.43
6. 29 698774.25 53 3978.40 1233.30 0.31 0.43
7. 29 698783.94 53 3883.89 660.26 0.17 0.45
8. 29 698792.56 53 3805.56 1674.45 0.44 0.46
9. 29 698800.81 53 3723.01 1079.67 0.29 0.47
10. 29 698812.25 53 3609.88 974.67 0.27 0.49
11. 29 698821.12 53 3507.24 1052.17 0.30 0.51
12. 29 698830.75 53 3412.57 1057.90 0.31 0.52
13. 29 698839.12 53 3316.35 232.14 0.07 0.54
14. 29 698847.69 53 3230.81 1421.56 0.44 0.55
15. 29 698856.31 53 3143.71 408.68 0.13 0.57
16. 29 698865.12 53 3040.42 1003.34 0.33 0.58
17. 29 698873.94 53 2952.94 413.41 0.14 0.60
18. 29 698883.37 53 2858.69 829.02 0.29 0.61
19. 29 698894.50 53 2748.46 659.63 0.24 0.63
20. 29 698905.62 53 2619.07 209.53 0.08 0.65
21. 29 698915.62 53 2522.75 807.28 0.32 0.67
22. 29 698925.81 53 2424.21 169.69 0.07 0.69
23. 29 698937.12 53 2314.55 624.93 0.27 0.70
24. 29 698947.81 53 2211.88 575.09 0.26 0.72
25. 29 698958.81 53 2106.84 0.00 0.00 0.74
26. 29 698968.81 53 2010.02 482.41 0.24 0.76
27. 29 698978.31 53 1901.58 133.11 0.07 0.78
28. 29 698988.75 153 1823.82 0.00 0.00 0.79
Figure 4: Output from third AF example.
than 1450 meters. Compare this to Line 2 of Example 2. At a
comparable range of 4276.28 meters, m = 0.76, and the
resulting distance error was 983.54 meters. Of course,
comparing random values for two cases is not very
informative. However, the 37 percent difference in m values
creates the opportunity for greater error.
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The impact of the difference in m values can be shown
through simple analysis of the data in Examples 2 and 3. In
Lines 1 through 26 of Example 2, the average distance error
is 300.82 meters; but in Example 3 the average error for
the first 26 lines is 896.35, almost three times as much.
This is an indicator of the impact over time of setting
knowledge to 0.3 instead of 0.8. In this comparison,
lowering knowledge by more than 50 percent resulted in
almost three times as much average error. In spite of these
odds, the AF destroyed its target from a greater distance in
Example 3 than it did in Example 2. In Line 28 of Example
3, the AF exploited an error of 0 by firing at the target
when it had perfect location information. This is an
example of how randomizing m can give the AF a chance of
success even when odds do not favor it.
A further comparison of the two examples is provided in
Figure 5. For each example, the actual error is plotted as
a function of the range to the target. The graph of k = 0.3
rises much more steeply than the graph of k = 0.8.
E. SPEED AND HEADING ERROR
The next two continuously-valued attributes that merit
discussion are speed and heading, both of which are passed
to the decision-making portion of the AF program and used in
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especially significant when the target is moving fast and
changing direction frequently. To successfully aim at
moving targets, the AF relies heavily on precise, and
current, information. Unfortunately, the network delays
alluded to earlier become even worse when users of the
simulator are making frequent course and speed changes.
Thus, the AF has the poorest information during those
momentf when the information is most critical. To further
distort speed and heading information by converting them to
beliefs merely compounds the existing error. However,
solutions to the network traffic problem are treated as a
separate issue. Consequently, the generation of beliefs for
speed and heading are discussed here as though the AF would
otherwise have perfect information.
1. Speed Error
The first thing to note about Example 4, shown in
Figure 6, is the target's overall behavior with regard to
speed.
The column labeled Actual shows the target's speed
as steady at 16.25 kilometers per hour for several cycles,
Lines 1 through 7. This is followed by a sudden drop to
2.49 kph and a sudden increase to 37.23 kph. However, the
target is not really accelerating from 2.49 kph to 37.23 kph
in a single cycle. That aberration is more than likely due
to lost state messages from the simulator. Each change in a
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KNOWLEDGE TO BELIEF CONVERSION
Introducing speed error into the AF input.
k = 0.7 v = 1.0 j = 1.0 q = 0.0
Line Error
Number Veh ID Time Type Range Actual Belief (kph) %Error m
I. 42 691569.44 6 4020.18 16.25 13.58 2.67 0.16 0.71
2. 42 691578.56 6 3793.25 16.25 16.08 0.17 0.01 0.74
3. 42 691588.00 6 3575.03 16.25 13.19 3.06 0.19 0.76
4. 42 691597.12 6 3363.86 16.25 15.30 0.95 0.06 0.78
5. 42 691605.81 6 3162.12 16.25 15.72 0.53 0.03 0.8C
6. 42 691615.75 6 2931.20 16.25 14.25 2.00 0.12 0.82
7. 42 691625.19 6 2712.16 16.25 14.35 1.90 0.12 0.85
8. 42 691636.00 6 2495.51 2.49 2.26 0.23 0.09 0.87
9. 42 691644.87 6 2411.69 37.23 36.31 0.92 0.02 0.89
10. 42 691655.06 6 2230.37 37.23 36.88 0.35 0.01 0.94
11. 42 691667.44 6 1682.45 1.06 1.05 0.01 0.01 0.99
12. 42 691680.50 6 1141.65 18.80 18.80 0.00 0.00 1.00
13. 42 691692.37 6 1C38.32 18.80 18.80 0.0c 0.00 1.00
14. 42 691703.37 6 754.62 18.80 18.80 0.00 0.00 1.00
15. 42 691713.44 6 495.19 18.80 18.80 0.00 0.00 1.00
16. 42 691725.94 6 151.93 18.80 18.80 C.00 0.00 1.00
17. 42 691738.62 106 216.13 18.80 18.80 0.00 0.00 1.00
Figure 6: Output from speed error example.
vehicle's speed triggers a message to all stations on the
network. Therefore, accelerating rapidly results in
overfilled message buffers. From Line 10 to Line 12, the
speed drops, then rises, and finally settles at 18.8 kph.
Although some speed information has clearly been lost, the
emerging pattern throughout the engagement is identifiable--
frequent stops and starts and sudden changes in
acceleration.
The Beliefs column shows the speed belief
calculated for each cycle. As in the previous belief
generation processes, the program first calculates a value
for d using the standard formula, but with different inputs.




Using Line 1 as an example, dactuai = 4020.18, and
the resulting value for d is 0.57. The remaining parameters
are shown in the example. Since m = 0.71 for Line 1, the
next step is to introduce up to 1 - m, or a 29 percent,
error in the speed belief. Continuing with Line 1 as an
example, the speed-error function accomplishes this by
computing an interval around the true speed value and then
selecting a number from this interval, as explained in
Chapter III. The interval is based on 1 - m. If 1 - m =
0.29, and the actual speed is 16.25, the interval would be
lb = 16.25 - 0.29(16.25) = 11.54
ub = 16.25 - 0.29(16.25) = 21.0,
thus allowing an opportunity for maximum error above or
below the true speed, or no error at all if the true speed
happens to be selected. In Line 1 of the example, the speed
selected was 13.58 kph, which is a 16 percent error.
Since speed error is a percentage of the true
speed, and since military combat vehicles do not move at
extremely high rates of speed, the belief speeds are
generally close to the actual speeds. A quick scan of the
column showing error in kph shows that the maximum error in
this example was 3.06 kph, on Line 3. Most of the errors
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were under 1 kilometer per hour. The effect that these
errors have on aiming at a moving target depend on the range
to the target, the speed of the AF tanks, and the speed of
the target in relative terms. That is, a fast-moving target
will always be harder to hit than a slow-moving one. Using
percentages to model speed-error mirrors this fact because a
given percentage of a higher speed is greater than the same
percentage of a slower speed.
2. Heading and View Direction Error
The final example in this chapter is used to
present a few key points about the direction belief
algorithm used by the program. This algorithm is used
twice, once to determine a belief about the direction in
which the target is traveling, and again to determine a
belief about which way the target is facing, or the view
direction. The view direction is important because that is
the direction in which the target fires its weapon. As with
speed information, heading information is used by the AF to
aim at a moving target.
Figure 7 depicts the output for Example 5; as
usual, the input parameters are displayed with the output.
The vehicle type and range columns have been omitted, but
that information may be found in the output for Exanple 2.
Both sets of data are from the same simulation.
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The heading belief algorithm relies on m to
determine belief. Initially, the program randomly selects a
belief that contains as much as 1 - m of error. However,
subsequent calculations use previous beliefs and the current
true value to determine the error. Each subsequent belief
is chosen from the interval formed by taking the difference
between the last belief and the current true heading.
Therefore, if the true heading remains constant, the beliefs
will gravitate, randomly, toward the true value. Also,
beliefs that are close to the truth will force subsequent
beliefs to be even closer.
The most significant feature of this algorithm is
its behavior over time. The entries in the Actual column
show the target moving for several cycles in a constant
direction, 304.73 degrees. After that it moves in a new
general direction, with slight changes between 226 and 229
degrees, for the next 21 cycles. Finally, it heads in a
general direction of 234 degrees for the last seven cycles.
When the target does not change course, the
beliefs tend toward the actual value within a relatively
short time. When the target changes course, the beliefs are
distorted at first, but then again tend toward the actual
value. If a belief happens to match the actual value due to
randomization, then the AF will keep that belief until the
target changes course again.
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KNOWLEDGE TO BELIEF CONVERSION
Introducing heading error into the AF input.
k = 0.8 v = 1.0 j = 1.0 q= 0.0
Line Error
umber Veh ID Time Actual Belief (degrees) m
1. 31 697819.81 304.73 299.73 5.00 0.77
2. 31 697826.37 304.73 306.56 1.83 0.78
3. 31 697832.94 304.73 304.08 0.65 0.78
4. 31 697840.56 304.73 304.65 0.08 0.78
5. 31 697847.25 304.73 304.76 0.02 0.79
6. 31 697855.69 226.72 255.27 8.54 0.79
7. 31 697862.75 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.80
8. 31 697869.75 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.80
9. 31 697876.75 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.81
10. 31 697883.69 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.82
11. 31 697890.87 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.82
12. 31 697898.25 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.83
13. 31 697905.25 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.84
14. 31 697912.37 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.84
15. 31 697920.06 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.85
16. 31 697927.81 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.86
17. 31 697935.69 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.87
18. 31 697945.06 227.56 227.56 0.00 0.88
19. 31 697954.25 227.55 227.54 0.00 0.88
20. 31 697963.19 227.40 227.38 0.02 0.89
21. 31 697972.06 228.76 228.71 0.04 0.90
22. 31 697982.94 228.81 228.81 0.00 0.91
23. 31 697995.44 228.95 228.89 0.05 0.92
24. 31 698009.12 228.95 228.93 0.02 0.93
25. 31 698020.06 228.95 228.95 0.00 0.94
26. 31 698034.00 228.95 228.94 0.00 0.95
27. 31 698042.37 234.60 232.64 1.96 0.96
28. 31 698052.00 234.60 235.11 0.50 0.97
29. 31 698060.62 234.60 234.43 0.18 0.97
30. 31 698069.12 234.60 234.60 0.00 0.98
31. 31 698078.50 234.51 234.51 0.00 0.99
32. 31 698088.25 234.51 234.51 0.00 0.99
33. 31 698097.62 234.51 234.51 0.00 1.00
Figure 7: Output from heading error example.
Example 5 provides an illustration of how this
works. Line 1 shows an initial belief of 299.73 degrees for
heading, which was 5 degrees off the actual heading. At the
time, m = 0.77. In Lines 2 through 5, the amount of error,
in degrees, becomes smaller as the belief heading values
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approach the actual heading, which remains constant. Then
there is a sudden change in heading in Line 6 and a
corresponding increase in error. This agrees with the
notion that an observer will probably be unsure of the
direction of a vehicle immediately after it changes course.
However, in Line 7, the belief randomly matched the truth.
In this algorithm, when a previous belief equals the current
heading value, the belief is retained. Therefore, the next
11 beliefs contain no error. When the target changes course
slightly in Line 19, some error is introduced. When the
target makes a greater course change in Line 27, even more
error is introduced, and then the pattern from Lines 1
through 5 repeats itself.
View direction beliefs are generated the same way
as heading beliefs. In the course of most simulations,
however, the target maintains a constant view direction,
that which is toward the AF platoon. Since the output on
view direction is very static a separatc example is not
presented.
F. SUMMARY
In this chapter, five examples were used to illustrat-
the generation of location, speed, heading, and, indirectly,
view direction beliefs. The calculation of location beliefs
was discussed in detail, with examples of how d and m are
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computed. Actual output from a simulation was used to show
the workings of the algorithms. In the next chapter, the
implementation of this program will be discussed.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
The AF application described in this thesis was
implemented as a single program with two distinct phases:
the observation and belief generation phase, and the
decision-making and execution phase. Program operation is
sequential, with each phase executing in turn. The phases
were implemented as separate rule-based programs using the C
Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS). The two
CLIPS programs were embedded in a main program written in C.
In this chapter, the organization of the overall program is
described in more detail.
A. ORGANIZATION AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
NPSNET can be operated on one or more graphics
workstations that are connected to a network. The AF
program, when it is used, must be on the same network, but
loaded on a workstation that is not running NPSNET.
Before starting the AF, a network interface program
must be started. This program provides the low-level
functions needed by the AF to operate as an independent
station on the network.
Upon starting the AF, there is a brief network
initialization period and then the user is given the c'-ance
to turn belief generation on or off. If it is turned off,
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then the decision-making phase of the program will be passed
incoming messages exactly as they are received from NPSNET.
If belief generation is turned on, each message will be
processed into beliefs.
The next step in the program sequence is to start the
CLIPS environment. This permits CLIPS function calls, such
as "load" and "run," directly from a main
program[Ref. 14]. Following that is a second
initialization period during which the user is prompted for
the type of mission the AF is to perform and the starting
location of the AF.
There are presently three basic missions the AF can
perform: reconnaissance, attack, or a user-defined mission.
The reconnaissance mission is applicable to most simulations
because it sets the AF platoons on a predetermined course
which can be intercepted by the user to stage an engagement.
The starting location consists of X and Z coordinates. They
can be anywhere in the NPSNET world space.
If desired, the user can also change the settings of
the parameters in the belief generation program. Chapter IV
contains a discussion of how the settings impact on program
operation. These settings are defined as defglobals in the
file afbelief.clp, which contains the CLIPS belief
generation program.
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After all initialization, the main decision loop of the
program begins. The sequence of events within the loop is
as follows:
1. Update the positions of all AF vehicles and target
vehicles, based on their last reported location and
speed.
2. If a new message is present, get the message off the
network; store the data in a temporary data structure.
3. Load the belief generation program into the CLIPS
environment, followed by the most current target data
and AF data. The most current target data will
normally be the contents of the latest state message.
But, if no message has arrived, the most current
information is that contained in the updated target
data structures.
4. Start the CLIPS program. It will run until no rules
remain on its agenda. While running, the CLIPS belief
generation program will load external data structures
with the beliefs that have been calculated. Since
these structures are defined outside of CLIPS, the data
is retained after the CLIPS program has run its course.
5. Start the decision-making phase. This is the second
CLIPS program, loaded in the same manner as the first.
Input is transferred from the data structures that were
loaded by the belief generation program. The output
from this phase is sent to NPSNET as an update message.
6. Continue looping until control-c is pressed.
An important characteristic of this organization is
that the CLIPS files are reloaded and run during each
decision loop. Although this impacts on the speed of
execution, it permits modification of either of the CLIPS
programs during execution. For example, if the value for
knowledge in the belief generation program is changed, and
64
the file is saved, the new value of that parameter will be
loaded during the next decision loop. Although this feature
is useful for program test and evaluation, it is not optimal
to have the main program read files from a disk during each
decision loop. CLIPS provides a means of compiling the
constructs into the main program so that it is entirely
self-contained.
The present version of the AF program includes a
special feature for tracking the behavior of the belief
generation program. When the program loads the proper data
structure with belief information, a copy of the data is
sent to NPSNET so that the belief can be displayed on the
screen. To avoid confusion, the belief is represented by a
unique object. This provides a visual picture of, for
example, where the AF believes a target is located.
B. SUMARY
Although the implementation of the AF is somewhat
simplistic, it lays the foundation for future autonomous
agent programming at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Successive versions will become more sophisticated as
researchers attempt to model more complex AF behavior (see
Chapter VI) . To handle this greater complexity, other
implementation approaches might be tried, such as coding the
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entire program in a procedural or object-oriented language
instead of a rule-based language.
From a hardware point of view, future refinements may
involve parallel processing of the AF phases, a better
approach to linking the AF with NPSNET (i.e., networking
issues), and experimenting with other platforms.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
While conclusions about implementation details were
discussed in Chapter V, this chapter focuses on the merits
of the model itself. First there is a review of the
original goals and assumptions and then an assessment of
this approach to modeling combat observation systems.
A. A REVIEW OF THE INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS AND STRATEGY
In Chapter I it was pointed out that this project began
with several key assumptions. The most important of these
was the assumption that the AF, when given perfect
information, would always hit its target. Therefore, the
goal was to allow the AF to operate with beliefs instead of
the true world state.
The basic strategy was to divide the AF program into
two broad functions that model real world combat subsystems:
battlefield observation and tactical decision making. The
observation function is concerned with how the AF gets its
information, and the decision making function chooses
courses of action based on that information. Since the
input to the AF program was to be NPSNET world state
messages, the observation function would have the task of
converting those state messages into information that is
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comparable to what the AF would have realistically been able
to obtain.
When modeling the combat observation subsystem, the
goal was to simulate the results of the process, not the
process itself. This approach was evident in the design of
the belief generation algorithms. In general, they sought
to simulate the results or consequences of human error
without attempting to simulate human thinking or perception.
B. OVERALL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Data provided in Chapter IV shows how rapidly the AF
can destroy a target when it has perfect information.
Testing of the AF program thus far shows that this is true
consistently. Therefore, assumptions about the AF's
performance with perfect information appear to have been
valid, at least when evaluating the AF's performance on
NPSNET. This assumption may not apply to all autonomous
force applications.
Regarding the choice of strategy, it will be necessary
to test the AF program extensively before the strategy can
be fully evaluated. At this point in the development,
however, the concept of dividing the AF into an observation
function and a decision making function appears to produce
the desired results. When beliefs are generated, the
effectiveness of the AF is measurably degraded. Since this
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was the original goal, and it was met, then it is tempting
to argue that this strategy works.
However, a possible weakness of this model, at least in
its current form, is that it may not be suited for modeling
a more sophisticated observation system. In a real
battlefield environment, there may be a great deal of
dialogue between decision makers and observers. When the
decision maker has a question, the observer can be queried.
Also, the observer's reports can be extremely detailed and
subjective, and may contain interpretations of what is seen
on the battlefield, not just descriptions. The current
approach, with its emphasis on restists instead of processes,
would have to be redesigned to model more of the human
thought processes that go into the acts of observing things
and reporting observations to others.
On the other hand, a model with as many features as
just described might no longer be appropriate for a real
time application. Furthermore, even in the real world,
small combat units such as tank platoons do not rely on
extremely sophisticated information gathering methods.
Given these arguments, it is probably fair to say that
this strategy is right for a relatively simple, small-unit
autonomous force application, but may not be a good general
approach to modeling the battlefield observation system as
it exists in the real world.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
The AF program will continue to be a valuable research
vehicle for others wishing to investigate autonomous agent
issues. Among the many enhancements that warrant additional
research are:
1. Adding line-of-sight computations to the observer
program so it can prevent the AF platoons from knowing
about objects that are not visible.
2. Adding a vehicle identification feature to the decision
making program so the AF can be selective about its
target choices.
3. Modeling more battlefield conditions, such as time of
day, weather, noise, and the duration of a battle.
4. Refining the vehicle type belief algorithms so that
they consider such things as what the vehicle is doing
when it is first spotted, the type of terrain the
vehicle is driving on (because trucks usually stay on
roads), and the view of the vehicle from the
perspective of the observer.
5. Experimenting with different reasoning techniques in
the discretely valued belief generation procedures.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter we presented the following conclusion:
the initial assumptions are valid and the approach is
probably appropriate for a system such as NPSNET. However,
this method may be oversimplified as a general purpose
strategy for autonomous agent programming.
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